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Interdependence of Rules 
and Regulatory Structure 
William P. Albrecht, Corinne Bronfrnan, and 
Harold C. Messenheimer 
We consider the regulatory structure of the U.S. securities, futures, and options 
markets. Much of  this regulatory structure has been in place for some time. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which oversees the securi- 
ties markets, was established in  1934. The Grain Futures Act of  1922 and the 
Commodity Exchange Act of  1936 form the underpinnings of the 1975 statute 
establishing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to oversee 
trading in futures and options on futures. 
Many of  the regulations that the CFTC and the SEC enforce are as old or 
older than the agencies themselves. One does not have to be a zealous deregula- 
tor to recognize that at least some of them are outdated and that at least some 
of the complaints about them are justified. These complaints generally fall into 
four broad areas: (1) the requirements imposed by  the CFTC and the SEC 
entail unnecessary duplication and inconsistencies; (2) the level or type of reg- 
ulation is inefficient (costs are greater than benefits); (3) regulation or the re- 
view procedures of  a regulatory authority are an impediment to innovation; 
and (4) differential regulation of  similar entities has resulted in an “unlevel” 
playing field. 
In recent years, unhappiness about financial regulation has led more than 
one critic to call for a merger of  the CFTC and the SEC. Recently there has 
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even been  a call for consolidation of  all agencies concerned with federal fi- 
nancial regulation in a single cabinet-level department.’ The result of the politi- 
cal debate on the issue of consolidation has been preservation of the status quo. 
The academic debate has noted that, while dual regulation may impose costs, 
competition between or among regulators may also benefit market participants 
by providing them with a choice.* 
In  this paper, we focus specifically on the question of efficient regulation 
and how the regulatory structure affects regulators’ incentives to act efficiently 
or inefficiently. To analyze the issues, we develop a model of regulation that 
describes the scope and the goals of an efficiency-seeking regulator with per- 
fect information. We then relax the assumption of efficiency seeking and char- 
acterize the behavior of a regulator who has additional arguments in his or her 
utility function. We extend the model to this more realistic regulator and exam- 
ine the constraints and incentives that affect that agency’s behavior. We use the 
model to analyze the impact of  different regulatory  structures on the extent 
and scope of regulation. In particular, we examine the effect of the number of 
regulators on the level of regulation. We conclude that regulatory competition 
is likely to lead to a more efficient level of regulation than will occur with a 
single regulator when substitute products are involved. We find that the oppo- 
site holds in the case of  complements. This leads to the conclusion that the 
desirability of combining the CFTC and SEC depends in part upon whether 
the products they regulate are substitutes or complements. 
We begin by providing a background for our model with a brief discussion 
of the rationale of regulation, the structure and function of a regulatory agency, 
and regulatory incentives. 
1.1  Background 
1.1.1  The Rationale of Regulation 
The goals of efficient regulation  of  securities and futures markets may be 
summarized under the following three headings: (1) customer protection, (2) 
financial system integrity, and (3) market price integrity. Customer protection 
includes protection from fraud and default. The potential for fraud and default 
raises  investors’  perceived  costs  of  transacting  much  like  a tax  on  trading 
would increase the cost of transacting. Regulation seeks to reduce those costs 
through a system of rules and regulations, governing, for example, registration, 
1. Sandner, (1993). Under the proposal, the following federal agencies would be consolidated: 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision,  the Federal Deposit Insur- 
ance Corporation, the CFTC, the SEC, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and certain regulatory functions nonessential to their primary oper- 
ations performed by the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Labor. 
2. Ed Kane has been the most prolific and articulate proponent of this view. See, for example, 
Kane (1984, 1988). 11  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
record keeping, and disclosure. Of course, by prescribing and proscribing spe- 
cific behaviors, such regulations impose their own costs on market participants. 
The second goal of regulation is financial system integrity. The possibility 
of a systemic problem, such as a bankruptcy of  one brokerage house with a 
domino effect on other market participants, imposes a taxlike cost on market 
participants that can be thought of as an additional cost of transacting, Regula- 
tors attempt to reduce this taxlike cost by imposing, for example, capital re- 
quirements and minimum margins.) 
The third goal is market price integrity. Market participants enjoy timely 
information about price relationships in futures and cash markets. And they 
use this information to make their plans. Consequently, “wrong” price signals, 
resulting from, say, manipulation or market fragmentation, harm market parti- 
cipants by misinforming them about market fundamentals. As with the other 
goals of regulation, this potential harm imposes a taxlike cost on market parti- 
cipants. Regulations that prescribe or proscribe certain behaviors to reduce this 
harm include position limits, position reporting, and trade practice restrictions. 
Regulation will be efficient with respect to each of  these goals when the 
marginal reduction in the anticipated cost from the various harms discussed 
above just equals the marginal cost imposed by the regulation. While our anal- 
ysis is generalizable to all the harms discussed above, we simplify by focusing 
on a single aspect of regulatory concern: fraud. Much of our financial regula- 
tory system is intended to protect against fraud. But why are specialized regu- 
lations and a specialized  agency necessary for financial  services? For most 
crimes such as robbery and murder, a general statutory prohibition suffices- 
as it does for fraud in the sale of many goods and services. 
Fraud, especially in financial services, is often difficult to dete~t.~  When one 
customer’s order is filled at a worse price than that of another customer, it may 
or may not be fraud. When a broker takes the other side of his customer’s order, 
it may or may not be fraud. When an agent loses money when trading a client’s 
account over which she has discretionary power, it may or may not be fraud. 
In  short,  financial fraud is harder to detect than  crimes  such as robbery  or 
murder. It is also harder to detect than some other types of  fraud. When, for 
example, something advertised as peanut butter turns out to be guano, there is 
no problem in detecting the fraud. 
Because of the difficulty of knowing when certain types of financial fraud 
have occurred, regulators have prescribed and proscribed various activities by 
those who engage in financial transactions on behalf of others. These prescrip- 
tions and proscriptions are designed to increase the costs of committing fraud 
and to make it easier to detect. Requiring floor brokers to execute orders in the 
order in which they are received makes it less likely that one customer will be 
3. Ensuring the survival of weak firms is not the purpose of  regulation addressing financial 
4. For a more complete analysis, see Albrecht and Messenheimer (1993). 
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favored over another. Requiring an audit trail for trades makes it easier to catch 
those who violate the rule concerning the order of execution. And, since market 
participants realize that detection is more likely because of the rule, it serves 
also to deter fraud. Presumably, then, the peculiar nature of  financial fraud 
justifies the existence of  independent  regulatory  agencies such as the CFTC 
and the SEC. 
In actual practice, three functions of the CFTC and the SEC have evolved. 
One is to write specific regulations to supplement the various provisions of the 
statute(s) each agency is charged with implementing. A second function is to 
monitor or audit compliance with these regulations by the exchanges and regu- 
lated firms. A third function is to enforce compliance with both the statute and 
the commission’s regulations. These three functions are the means by which a 
specialized financial regulatory agency actually goes about detemng fraud. 
1.1.2  Regulatory Incentives 
Writing an efficient set of regulations, given the imperfect information avail- 
able to the agency, would be difficult even if there were strong incentives to 
adopt such a set of rules. The real incentives, however, are quite different. In 
large measure, this is because those who enact the legislation the agency im- 
plements and who oversee the agency’s performance are often much less inter- 
ested in economic efficiency than in their own political well-being. 
One result of this interest in their own political well-being is to give regula- 
tors an incentive to protect the agency from blame if something goes wrong. 
They do not want to have to explain such an event to Congress. The preferred 
way of protecting the agency is to have enough regulations in place to cover 
every conceivable form of fraud or other undesirable behavior. Thus, even if 
something does go wrong, the agency can point out that one of its regulations 
has been violated and that it should not be blamed for what has happened. This 
point of view is particularly strong among staff members who are responsible 
for writing rules. 
Another very strong incentive is to make it easy to catch violators by requir- 
ing many records to be kept and by prohibiting any behavior that might con- 
ceivably facilitate fraud-without  paying much attention to cost. This incen- 
tive  is  particularly  strong  among  staff  members who  are responsible  for 
enforcing rules. 
For the purpose of establishing a useful benchmark, we initially assume that 
regulators, irrespective of the regulatory structure, are motivated solely by ef- 
fi~iency.~  The benchmark so established will be used to evaluate how closely 
real regulatory structures containing real regulators are able to approach it. 
5. This benchmark is relevant to the extent one feels that efficiency should be the regulatory 
objective. Other regulatory objectives might be equity (or fairness). To enforce equity in order that 
the unsophisticated have access to capital and futures markets, while being protected from possible 
abuses, SEC and CFTC  regulators emphasize protection of the small investor and customer in their 
rule making. Our focus on efficiency is intended to encourage advocates of equity and fairness to 
consider trade-offs with efficiency. 13  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
1.2  A Model of Regulation 
We develop the benchmark diagrammatically in figures 1.1 and 1.2. Firms 
organize  to facilitate  transacting.  We  call  this  facilitation  “transaction  ser- 
vices,” the quantity of which we represent by  Q.  Q, for example, could be 
thought of as containing the qualities of immediacy, standardization of contract 
terms, and guarantee of performance provided by futures exchanges. Assume 
initially that there is no regulation of  Q. For simplicity, assume also that the 
per unit cost of providing Q is constant as indicated by the horizontal  supply 
curve S. 
The demand curve D for transaction services has the usual properties. It is 
downward sloping with respect to price. Again, if we think of Q as having the 
qualities of immediacy,  standardization of  contract terms, and guarantee of 
performance, then price can be thought of  as the sum of the bid-ask spread, 
the exchange fee, and the clearing fee. The lower this price, everything else 
being equal, the greater is the quantity of  Q demanded. The demand curve’s 
location and slope depend on the prices of substitutes and complements as well 
as other relevant  states of nature.  For example, the demand for transaction 
services provided by exchanges depends, in part, on the price of the over-the- 
counter transaction services. And the demand for transaction services provided 
for risk-shifting products depends on the price of transaction services in capi- 
tal markets. 
Demanders know they face some prospect of fraud when purchasing Q. For 
example, in an exchange-type market, immediacy is provided by liquidity sup- 
pliers who stand ready  to buy or to sell from the other market participants. 
While serving as an intermediary, the immediacy provider has ample opportu- 
nity to commit fraud through dishonest sales or trade practices (say by trading 
at the same time as a customer’s order and taking the best fill). Whatever the 
particular source of the prospective fraud, demanders’ behavior is altered relu- 
five fu  nu fraud because their expected return is reduced and uncertainty in- 
creased. Their valuation of prospective fraud imposes a taxlike increase in the 
price paid for Q, which for simplicity we treat as a constant, per-unit tax. This 
unit  taxlike valuation  of prospective fraud by  demanders  is denoted  by  q, 
which serves to shift the demand curve faced by suppliers from D to D -  T,  in 
figure 1.1.  Instead of the honest amount of equilibrium transaction services Qu, 
Q, emerges in the presence of fraud. 
Referring to figure  1.1, we see that regulation has the potential  to reduce 
two losses that exist relative to “no threat of fraud.” First, there are losses repre- 
sented in the lightly shaded Harberger triangle.6 The triangle represents the 
potential gains from trade that are forgone because of the taxlike wedge im- 
6. Harberger (1959). Harberger measured the welfare cost of monopoly as the loss in consumer 
surplus because of the restriction on output and the higher price at which the reduced output was 
sold. His approach was subsequently applied to the analysis of tariffs. The Harberger triangle in 
this study arises through the distortion in trading behavior because of the presence of fraud, which 
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Fig. 1.1  Prospective valuation of fraud (T,.) modifies behavior like a tax 
posed between demanders and suppliers of Q.  The other loss associated with 
T, is represented by the darkly shaded Tullock rectangle.’ This economic loss 
arises because  resources devoted  to deception  are diverted  from  potentially 
productive uses. For example, resources devoted to trade practice fraud could 
be diverted to providing  improved transaction services, say by  providing in- 
creased liquidity. Resources devoted to sales practice fraud could be diverted 
to the provision  of honest  Q (or some other honest endeavor that promotes 
gains from trade). Therefore, the Tullock rectangle is recognized as being, not 
a mere transfer from demanders to crooks, but a real economic loss in terms 
of wasted resources.8 
Thus, we see that the total of the economic losses caused by fraud are the 
sum of  the areas of the shaded triangle and rectangle. Looked at differently, 
the remaining gains from trade, in the presence of fraud and absent regulation, 
are the consumer surplus triangle a(6 + T,)b in figure 1.1. The potential role 
for regulators to improve efficiency is clear from the figure. They can simply 
impose rules that reduce the threat of fraud and so reduce the demanders’ pro- 
spective valuation of it. By imposing and enforcing a set of rules, they shift the 
demand curve (D -  T,) toward the demand curve D; that is, by reducing the 
taxlike fraud premium, they reduce the losses represented by the Harberger 
triangle and Tullock rectangle. Looked at differently, by reducing the taxlike 
fraud premium, they increase the gains from trade represented by the consumer 
surplus triangle. 
7. The extensive literature on rent seeking as an economic loss began with Gordon Tullock’s 
article “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” first published in the Wesrern Eco- 
nomic Journal in June 1967. That essay and many of  the important contributions since are col- 
lected in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980) and Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1987). 
8. The rent-seeking literature is divided on the proportion of the rectangle that is an economic 
loss (Tullock 1980). The opportunity cost of resources devoted to fraud could be greater than, less 
than, or equal to this rectangle. The exact proportion is not relevant to our analysis, but for simplic- 
ity we will follow Posner (1975) and assume that the rent-seeking loss from fraud is equal to the 
area of the rectangle. 15  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
1.2.1  The Impact of Costs on Regulatory Initiatives 
Regulation,  of  course,  is  not  costless,  and  efficiency-seeking  regulators 
would take into account both the direct and the indirect costs imposed. Direct 
costs are imposed by regulators when rules designed to reduce the fraud pre- 
mium prescribe or proscribe certain behaviors. For example, regulators may 
prescribe record-keeping rules that increase the probability of detecting fraud, 
or they may proscribe certain trade practices to increase the cost of committing 
fraud; in so doing, they also increase the cost of providing immediacy. Indirect 
costs are the rent-seeking activity that is generated because of the potential to 
influence regulation. Once an agency is charged with writing rules, interest 
groups will spend considerable resources to influence the writing of the statute 
that is to govern the rule writing. And once the statute is enacted, further re- 
sources will be spent to influence the rule writers. Inasmuch as interest groups 
seek to obtain differential advantage via the political-regulatory  process, these 
resources are ~asted.~ 
The overall effect of the reduction in fraud and increase in costs is shown 
by  the example in figure  1.2. The figure illustrates a case where regulation 
reduces the prospective valuation of fraud to q,  and simultaneously increases 
the unit cost of  providing  Q by  T,.  T,  is a per-unit taxlike cost imposed on 
suppliers.  It  includes  direct  costs  of  regulation  as well  as  additional  rent- 
seeking costs. Since T,  is less than (T, -  ZJ,  Q will increase to QR,  and con- 
sumer surplus will increase to triangle a(4  + T,)bR. 
It is obvious that, in the case where potential regulation  would increase T, 
more than T,  would be reduced, there is no set of regulations that will produce 
a triangle larger than u(el  + T,)b  in figure 1.1. In that case, any existing (effi- 
ciency-seeking) regulators of Q would simply choose the null set of regula- 
tions. There would be no need for a specialized regulatory agency. 
Recall that we sought in this section to establish an efficiency benchmark. 
We have now done so. The goal of efficiency-seeking regulators is clear from 
figure  1.2: they should choose the set of regulations that maximizes the con- 
sumer surplus triangle.  Put differently,  they  should minimize the combined 
losses associated with prospective fraud and regulatory costs, that is, minimize 
the sum (q  + T,)  in figure 1.2. Put still differently, they should choose the set 
of regulations that maximizes equilibrium Q. By maximizing Q, the regulators 
will maximize gains from trade enjoyed by market users. 
What if the regulator does not choose the efficient set of regulations? How 
can outcomes be  characterized  when  the regulator over- or underregulates? 
After all, regulation cannot be defined in homogeneous units. Consider regula- 
tions, for example, that prescribe certain behaviors  such as registration  and 
record keeping. Even something as simple as registration cannot be defined in 
9. Again the reader is referred to the rent-seeking literature, much of which is contained in 
Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980) and Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1987). 16  William P. Albrecht, Corinne Bronfman, and Harold C. Messenheimer 
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Fig. 1.2  Efficient regulation: top, supply and demand; bottom, cost of 
regulation and cost of fraud 
homogeneous units. Who is to be registered? What are the criteria for accep- 
tance of a potential registrant? How much information is required of a regis- 
trant? How  often, and to what extent, will  the information be updated  and 
reviewed subsequent to registration? Similar remarks apply to various regula- 
tions that proscribe certain behaviors.  In  what sense, then, may we think of 
there being more (or less) regulation if we cannot measure it? 
We assume that the regulator will attempt to choose the least costly set of 
regulations for each quantity of prospective fraud reduced.'" We call this the 
correct  approach.  By  this  assumption,  each  incremental  regulatory  action, 
10. We justify this assumption when we evaluate the incentives of regulators in section 1.2.2. 17  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
which further circumscribes or frees behavior in some fashion, changes pro- 
spective fraud (AT,) and the unit cost (AT,) of providing transaction services 
such that the ratio (-AT,)/(AT,)  is maximized among the remaining regula- 
tions. For example, a new registration requirement reduces prospective fraud, 
say by reducing the likelihood that crooks will enter, but it does so only by 
increasing the unit cost of transaction services. And it is the most effective 
possible change in regulation as long as the ratio is maximized and the regula- 
tor is using the correct approach. This is illustrated by the regulatory produc- 
tion frontier in the lower half of  figure 1.2. When the marginal unit cost of 
regulation  T, and the marginal amount of  fraud reduced are equivalent, the 
regulator achieves efficiency. The efficient set of  regulations R imposes cost 
Tce.  Points labeled b, in the upper and lower halves of figure 1.2 are equivalent. 
Assuming  that the regulator follows the correct approach,  we can derive 
possible equilibria for different levels of regulation. These are shown graphi- 
cally along the locus in figure 1.3. These equilibria reflect market adjustments 
to the two unit taxlike effects of changing regulation: the change in the pro- 
spective valuation  of fraud by demanders, and the change in the unit cost of 
providing Q. Q,  and P, are the market price and quantity when regulation  is 
zero. Q,  and P,  are the market price and quantity when regulation  is R. The 
locus of regulatory  equilibria  (LORE) is the  schedule  of  market price  and 
quantity for each level of regulation. Between points 0 and e, as the level of 
regulation is increased from zero to R, the prospective valuation  of  fraud is 
being reduced faster than the unit cost of providing that level of  regulation 
increases. Thus, Q and consumer surplus are increasing over that range. As the 
level of regulation  increases above R, the unit cost of providing  Q increases 
faster than the prospective valuation of fraud is reduced. Thus, Q and consumer 
surplus are decreasing. The efficiency-seeking regulator (with perfect informa- 
tion) will choose level of regulation R. Market participants adjust to point e in 
figure 1.3. At this point, consumer surplus and Q are maximized. 
Underlying LORE are the demand and supply curves that reflect the trading 
PI 
C 
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public and the trading technology. It follows that LORE will differ according 
to the structure of the particular market being regulated, as the point at which 
costs increase more rapidly than benefits will not occur at the same point in all 
markets. This suggests that arguments to “level the playing field” across differ- 
ent markets, by making the regulatory approach and magnitude consistent, are 
not arguments for efficiency.’’ 
1.2.2  The Incentives of Regulators 
Even well-intentioned  regulators are not generally motivated solely by effi- 
ciency. They may believe that reducing fraud always enhances efficiency; or, 
in a world of imperfect information, they may not know whether their regula- 
tions are overly burdensome. They may also enjoy the power and perks of their 
position. Therefore, we now consider the arguments that may plausibly enter 
a regulator’s utility  function and how they affect the level of  regulation. We 
model the regulator of market i as having a utility function of the form 
where the signs over the arguments indicate the signs of the first partial deriva- 
tives. We can write the utility function in this form because each of the argu- 
ments is a function of the amount of regulation chosen by the regulator.12  Q, the 
volume of trade, is a good proxy for the present value of the regulators’ money 
income and prestige.13  R, the number and the comprehensiveness of the regula- 
tions enacted by the regulator, is a good proxy for the regulator’s power and 
perks. T,  is the per-unit fraud tax, the public “bad” that the regulator would like 
to reduce. The regulator’s marginal utility decreases as Q increases (  Uoo <  0), 
decreases as R increases CUR, <  0), and decreases as fraud increases (U, >  0). 
While the costs of regulation are not included explicitly in the formulation 
above, they do enter into the demand and supply equilibrium constraints that 
are embedded in it. Q, is determined in equilibrium by demanders and suppli- 
ers in market 1 and substitute/complement markets. dQ,/dR,  is determined by 
the change in the valuation of prospective fraud, the change in costs imposed 
in market 1, and relevant feedback effects among other markets. The regulator 
chooses R, to maximize his or her utility, taking into account the expected 
11. Stephen Schaefer (1 992) reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of capital requirements 
and arguments in support of “functional” regulation to ensure that banks and securities firms are 
regulated equally. He demonstrates that there may well be valid reasons for higher capital require- 
ments on banks. 
12. The particular specification has the advantage of being simple. More important, by focusing 
attention on the incentives of regulators, it provides a framework for an analysis of  regulatory 
structure. 
13. In general, the prestige of an agency is directly related to its size, the size of its budget, and 
the number of high-salary positions in the agency, which, in turn, are a function of the size and 
importance of the industry it regulates. Furthermore, the expected value of a regulator’s postregula- 
tory income is also a function of the size of the regulated industry. 19  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
adjustment of participants in market 1 and all related markets. The question is 
whether a utility-maximizing regulator will have a tendency to overregulate, 
underregulate, or (as if led by an invisible hand) to seek efficiency. 
The first-order condition for the regulator’s utility maximum is 
Assume that (dQ,/dR,)  > 0, so that the regulator has the potential to increase 
efficiency with more regulation. Will it be in her self-interest to do so? Con- 
sider the signs of each of the terms in the marginal-utility expression for the 
regulator: 
+  +  -- 
(3)  u dQ  -1  + u,,  t  u  dTFI  -  -  -  MU,. 
‘ldR,  TFldR, 
The terms on the left of equation (3) all tend to increase the regulator’s utility 
as she increases R,,  which suggests that regulators have very little incentive to 
underregulate. And if, by some fortuitous circumstance, a regulator stumbled 
onto the efficient point ((dQ,/dR,)  = 0),  that agent would be motivated to keep 
increasing regulation, since 
0  +  -- 
(4) 
dQ  dTF  u’+u  +u  ‘>O. 
“‘dR,  TFldR, 
This is demonstrated in figure 1.4, where the LORE derived in figure 1.3 is 
replotted in Q,, R, space. The regulator has the utility function posited above, 
and chooses level of regulation  R, where the marginal rate of  substitution of 
Q,  for R,  along indifference curve U, is tangent to the locus of regulatory equi- 
libria.  Contrast  indifference  curve  U,  with  the  indifference  curve  of  an 
efficiency-seeking regulator. Recall that the efficiency-seeking regulator does 
not have R as a direct argument in her utility  function, and neither does R 
enter it indirectly through prospective fraud. Therefore, the efficiency-seeking 
regulator  will  have  horizontal  indifference  curves  and  choose  the  efficient 
quantity of regulation Re where indifference curve y  is tangent to the LORE. 
We see that more realistic regulators will have a natural tendency to overregu- 
late, for example, by the amount R, -  Re  in figure 1.4. 
1.3  Regulatory Competition and Its Implications for Regulatory 
Structure 
If there were only a single market, a regulator would need to consider only 
the impact of the regulation on market  1. For this regulator, the marginal rate 
of  substitution (MRS)  between Q,  and R,  is 20  William P. Albrecht, Corinne Bronfman, and Harold C. Messenheimer 
Fig. 1.4  Incentives of regulators and regulatory outcomes 
The first-order condition for an efficiency-seeking regulator is defined by the 
condition that dQ,ldR, = 0 at the utility maximizing point. Thus, in the case 
where the regulator does not derive utility  from reduced  fraud or increased 
regulation,  the  numerator  of  MRS would  be  zero.  In  terms  of  figure  1.4, 
the regulator would have horizontal indifference curves such as U,, and choose 
regulatory  vector Re where Q,  would be maximized and efficiency  attained. 
More generally, however, equation  (5) shows that a regulator will trade  off 
more regulation for a reduced level of transaction services. The regulator who 
gets utility from regulation and from decreasing fraud will increase regulation 
beyond the efficient point, that is, beyond where dQ,ldR, = O.I4 As the level of 
regulation is increased, dQ,/dR, < 0, until,  at  some point,  the  extra utility 
gained from a small increase in regulation and reduction in fraud is offset by 
the extra utility lost from decreasing transaction services. 
Now  suppose that there is another market  where the products traded are 
reasonably  close  substitutes (complements)  with  those traded  on market  1. 
With substitute (complement) markets, a change in regulation in market 1 will 
affect the demand for transaction services in market 2.  And a change in regula- 
tion in the substitute market 2 will affect the utility of the regulator of market 
1. Holding R,  constant, we differentiate regulator  1’s marginal rate of substitu- 
tion of R, for Q, with respect to a change in R,. 
14. We  note additionally that a very zealous regulator could he characterized by  a first-order 
condition > 0 even at the point where dQ,/dR, < 0 so long as UR,  >>  0 (large) and dT,,/dR,  << 
0 (that is, changing by a lot). These results show that, under plausible assumptions about regulatory 
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Notice that the marginal rate of  substitution will decrease or increase de- 
pending on whether markets 1 and 2 are substitutes or complements. We know 
that the two terms in parentheses in the numerator are positive, the denomina- 
tor is positive, and  Upp  is negative  (by assumption). Our characterization  of 
regulatory behavior,  that is, that regulators  tend to overregulate, means that 
dQ,/dR, is positive when markets  1 and 2 are substitutes and negative when 
they  are complements. An increase  in R2 raises the fraud-adjusted  price  of 
transaction  services in that market. Therefore, some demanders will  shift to 
market  1 when they are substitutes, implying that dQ,/dR, > 0. We illustrate 
this effect in figure 1.5. 
Fig. 1.5  Substitute markets: top, LORE shifts outward when the other 
regulator increases regulation; bottom, the potential gain to the regulator from 
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In  the top panel, the regulator chooses R,, so as to maximize utility given 
LORE as a constraint. Initially, regulator 1 is at point a on indifference curve 
U,,. When the regulator in the substitute market increases R2 from R,,  to R21, 
LORE in market 1 shifts upward (dQ,ldR, > 0), and regulator  1 will find in- 
creased utility U;,  at point b. Because the markets are substitutes, if increased 
regulation in market 2 has the effect of decreasing Q2,  there will be an increase 
in Ql,  and regulator 1’s marginal rate of substitution will decrease (increase in 
absolute value). We can also demonstrate diagrammatically these interactions 
between the two regulators. 
Refer again to the top panel of figure 1.5. After the increase in regulation in 
market 2, the regulator of market 1 will increase regulation from R,, to R,,  so 
as to put herself on indifference curve U,,  at point c. These responses of regula- 
tor 1 are replotted in R2,  R, space in the lower panel of figure 1  .5.15 
In the lower panel, El  is regulator 1’s independent adjustment response to the 
quantities of regulation chosen by regulator 2. Similarly, E, is the independent 
adjustment response of regulator 2 to quantities of regulation chosen by regula- 
tor 1. If the two regulators exhibit Cournot-Nash behavior, they will be in equi- 
librium at point a. Notice that indifference curve U,,  in the upper panel through 
points a, d, and e is redrawn in the lower panel of figure 1.5. Similarly we draw 
an indifference curve for regulator 2 through point a. If the regulators recog- 
nize their interdependence, they will have an incentive to engage in cartellike 
behavior so as to move to the regulators’  contract curve. Because movement 
toward the curve results in increased regulation and decreased Q in both mar- 
kets, market participants are worse off relative to the independent adjustment 
equilibrium.  I6 
To derive algebraically the slopes of the regulators’ response curves shown 
in figure 1.5, we totally differentiate the first-order condition (equation [2]) for 
the regulator of market  1 (R,  can be thought of as an implicit function of R2). 
15. We note that, since information is imperfect, shifts in the pattern of trade between markets 
are a noisy signal. An increase in volume could represent a vote of confidence in the regulatory 
environment, or a flight from a less-efficient regulatory regime. 
16. However, over-regulation may serve as an incentive to innovation elsewhere. The futures 
markets have seen a huge growth in the cash foreign exchange market and a far lower growth in 
their markets. Some of the rules of  trading on a contract market make it difficult for large institu- 
tional traders to accomplish their trades at minimum price impact. They find it more cost-effective 
to use a market where private negotiation of trades is not prohibited, as it is under the open and 
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Assuming that regulators exhibit Cournot-Nash behavior, the slope of the regu- 
lator of market 1's response curve is given by 
Similarly, the slope of the response curve of the regulator of market 2 is 
We can now see that regulator 1's response curve (E,)  would be vertical if she 
were efficiency seeking, since in that case dQ,ldR, = 0. By similar reasoning, 
regulator 2's  response curve (E,) would be horizontal  if  he were efficiency 
seeking (dQ,ldR, = 0). Notice also that the slope of regulator 1's (2's) response 
curve will be less (greater), the greater is the change in her marginal utility 
directly via R (the level of regulation) and TF (the amount of fraud) from chang- 
ing regulation. 
Interactions between the two regulators occur when at least one of  them is 
not efficiency seeking, that is, when writing regulations or reducing fraud are 
arguments in at least one regulator's utility function. As the quantity of transac- 
tion services in market i changes because of a change in the level of regulation 
in market j,  the behavior of  an efficiency-seeking regulator will not change. 
Formally, dR,ldR, = 0 holds so long as dQ,ldR, = 0. As we saw in figure 1.5, 
however, the situation is quite different when we have a regulator who values 
fraud reduction and the articulation of rules in and of themselves. In the case 
of substitute markets, this kind of regulator will face a relaxed constraint when 
the other regulator increases regulation. She will enjoy a positive externality 
(her LORE in  figure 1.5 shifts upward)  and increase regulation  in her own 
market. Similarly, if the other regulator reduces regulation, she will be further 
constrained and decrease regulation in her own market. 
The direction of the interactions is just the opposite in complement markets, 
as is illustrated in figure 1.6. In the top panel, the regulator chooses R,, so as 
to maximize utility, given LORE as a constraint. Initially, the regulator is at 
point a on indifference curve U,,  . When the regulator in the complement mar- 
ket increases R, from R,, to R,,,  LORE shifts downward, and regulator l finds 
herself with reduced utility  U;(,  at point b. Because the markets are comple- 
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also decrease. Because regulator  1's marginal rate of substitution will, there- 
fore, have increased (decreased in absolute value), she responds by decreasing 
regulation from R,, to R,, to put herself on indifference curve U,, at point c. 
The corresponding responses of regulator 1 are replotted in R,,  R,  space in the 
lower panel of figure 1.6. 
As in figure 1.5, E,  is regulator 1's independent adjustment response to the 
quantities of regulation chosen by regulator 2. Similarly, E, is the independent 
adjustment response of regulator 2 to quantities of regulation chosen by regula- 
tor 1. If  the two regulators exhibit Cournot-Nash behavior, they will be in equi- 
librium at point c. Indifference curve U,,  through points d, c, and e is redrawn 
in the lower half of  the figure. Similarly, we draw an indifference curve for 
regulator 2 through point c. If the regulators recognize their interdependence, 
then they will have an incentive to engage in cartellike behavior so as to move 
to the regulators'  contract curve. But by  so doing, they actually make market 
I 
Fig. 1.6  Complementary markets: top, LORE shifts inward when the other 
regulator increases regulation; bottom, the potential gain to the regulator from 
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Table 1.1  Taxonomy of Regulatory Collusion Relative to Cournot-Nash 
Equilibrium 
When the Markets Are Substitutes 
Regulator  I 
Enjoys regulating and 
reducing fraud, U,  = 
Ui(Q,vRi,T,i) 
Only enjoys increasing Q, 
does not regulate for any 
other reason, U, = U,(Q,) 
Regulator 2 
Enjoys regulating and  both move further from  regulator  1 efficient, 
reducing fraud, U, =  efficiency  regulator 2 constrained 
UL(Q2.  RZ2  T,J 
Only enjoys increasing  regulator 2 efficient,  both regulators are 
Q, does not regulate for  regulator 1 constrained  efficient 
any other reason, U2  = 
U,(QJ  efficiency 
from moving further from 
efficiency 
from moving further from 
When the Markets Are Complements 
Regulator  1 
Regulator 2 
Enjoys regulating and 
reducing fraud, U,  = 
U,(Ql&  T,) 
Only enjoys increasing 
Q, does not regulate for 
any other reason, U, = 
U2(Q2) 
Enjoys regulating and re- 
ducing fraud, U,  = 
U,  (Q,  R,  T,, ) 
both move closer to effi. 
ciency 
regulator 2 efficient, regu- 
lator I constrained from 
moving further from effi- 
ciency 
Only enjoys increasing Q, 
does not regulate for any 
other reason, U = U,(Q,) 
regulator 1 efficient, regu- 
lator 2 constrained from 
moving further from effi- 
ciency 
both regulators are effi- 
cient 
Note: The cells in the matrices represent predicted departures from/moves toward efficiency when 
the regulators collude. 
participants better off relative to the independent adjustment equilibrium. So 
we see opposite effects when regulators collude, depending on whether the 
markets regulated are substitutes or complements. 
We now summarize our results and apply them to the question of  whether 
there is a regulatory structure that will encourage efficiency-seeking regula- 
tion. As mentioned in the introduction, various proposals to consolidate finan- 
cial regulation in one agency have recently been advanced. Because a merger 
greatly decreases the costs of collusion, we have summarized the different col- 
lusive outcomes in table  1.1 for both substitute and complement markets for 
the case where the regulators are efficiency seeking and for the case where 
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The table provides a taxonomy of the effects of regulatory collusion relative 
to the Cournot-Nash duopoly equilibrium. The upper panel shows the results 
for substitute markets, the lower for complement markets. We see that only in 
the case of substitute  markets does collusion  lead to  a worse outcome. But 
casual empiricism would suggest that this is the situation relevant to regulatory 
structure. Inasmuch as consolidation  of the CFTC and SEC into one agency 
reduces the cost of collusion, it increases the departure from efficiency. Rules 
are not independent of the regulatory structure. 
One other aspect of regulatory competition  that cannot be captured in our 
static  model  deserves  mention.  Financial  markets are highly  innovative,  in 
terms of the development of new products  and new trading  structures. This 
innovation poses a problem for a regulator concerned with the appropriate level 
of regulation  (and this is true whether the regulator  is efficiency seeking or 
departs from efficiency). As markets evolve, the appropriate level of regulation 
is likely to evolve as well. To fine-tune regulation, however, the regulator must 
maintain accurate information about the workings of the market it regulates. It 
is almost taken as axiomatic that the regulator’s information lags market prac- 
tice (see, e.g., Hu 1993). The magnitude of this lag will depend on the ability 
of the regulator to acquire information from market participants. 
It is also possible that regulatory competition could result in an increase in 
the decentralized production of information in a Hayekian sense. Say, for ex- 
ample, in seeking to avoid a “crisis” the CFTC imposed regulations that were 
overly burdensome relative to efficiency and to SEC regulations. The resulting 
out-migration of business and decline in innovation would serve as a signal to 
the CFTC to reevaluate its regulations with respect to that “crisis.” Separate 
regulators will react to the unique circumstances of their own markets. On the 
other hand,  a consolidated  regulatory  authority  will  likely result in  a more 
generalized approach, and it might be less responsive to changes in one mar- 
ket’s circumstances. On this, Fischel (1  989) has said: 
[Rlegulatory bodies, like the organized exchanges they regulate, compete to 
supply rules and regulations that facilitate the provision of transaction ser- 
vices. To  the extent that one regulatory body does a poor job in providing 
such rules and regulations, investors will shift to other exchanges governed 
by  different  and  superior rules  where  substitute  financial  products  are 
traded. Thus, competition among regulatory agencies creates an incentive to 
provide rules and regulations  that benefit  investors  and at the same time 
limits the size of the regulatory tax that any agency can impose. (1  18) 
Kane (1984) best sums up the view that the process of regulatory competi- 
tion itself overwhelms any short-run losses reflected in criticisms of existing 
regulatory structure. 
[I]n the long run, competition among financial regulators lowers the level of 
the regulatory  tax  by  fostering efficiency in the production  of  regulatory 
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guided by  an invisible  hand  to produce  subtle and long-run  benefits  that 
are imperceptible to uncritical observers. Even though regulatory  overlaps 
impose avoidable short-run costs, they facilitate a generalized form of mar- 
ket entry and exit that promotes dynamic or evolutionary optimality. Dupli- 
cate regulatory function and overlapping administrative boundaries provide 
opportunities for the entry and exit of regulatees.  Regulated firms (espe- 
cially  new  entrants into regulated  and  substitute markets)  shrink the  do- 
mains (and therefore the budget resources) of regulators whose response to 
the evolving  needs  of  the  marketplace  proves  short-sighted or inflexible. 
(369) 
1.4  Conclusion 
Our analysis is based  on the belief  that the goal of regulation  should be 
efficiency. First, we provided a framework that characterizes efficient regula- 
tion in financial markets. Second, we formulated a model of regulatory behav- 
ior that takes into account the incentives of regulators. We focused particularly 
on these incentives because we believe they are central to the regulatory out- 
come, whereas much of the current discussion of regulatory reform seems to 
assume implicitly that significant changes in  this outcome can be  achieved 
without regard to these incentives. Last, we developed a framework for pre- 
dicting the impact of regulatory structure on efficiency. 
Our results suggest the following general principles about regulatory struc- 
ture and regulatory competition. A change in the structure of financial services 
regulation would reduce some costs, such as those associated with duplicative 
or inconsistent regulations. It may also increase other costs due to (increased) 
overregulation.  Competition  between  regulators  of  substitute  markets  in- 
creases efficiency, whereas such competition decreases efficiency in the case 
of complementary markets. Collusion between regulators of complement mar- 
kets increases efficiency, whereas such competition decreases efficiency when 
the markets are substitutes. The question of optimal regulatory structure, there- 
fore, depends on the incentives facing regulators, and the degree of comple- 
mentarity or substitutability of the products to be regulated. In any event, rules 
are not independent of the regulatory structure. 
Our analysis does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a merger of 
the CFTC and the SEC would be beneficial or detrimental to the cause of effi- 
ciency. There is first of all the question of whether the markets the two agencies 
regulate are primarily substitutes or primarily complements. Even if they are 
substitutes, the case where  regulatory  competition  can lead to greater effi- 
ciency, the savings from reducing duplication and inconsistency may be greater 
than the risks of overregulation brought about by  elimination of competition 
through the merger. Then there is the question of the production of knowledge 
under alternative regulatory  regimes. If the “regulatory net burden” can per- 
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participants result in the production of  information in a Hayekian, decentral- 
ized sense? Or are we extending the knowledge argument too far? Thus, even 
if  one were to accept our model and believe that the markets are primarily 
substitutes, one would still need to know the relative costs and benefits of alter- 
native regulatory structures. 
Our own view is that the markets are substitutes and that the costs of merger 
would be high and the benefits low relative to the current structure and relative 
to alternative reforms. If we were to array the possible number of regulators 
along the real number line from zero to plus infinity, one regulator would prob- 
ably be the number we would be least likely to choose, at least from the per- 
spective of prospective efficiency. That, however, is at least another paper. 
Other proposals for reform of the regulatory structure have been made, such 
as the proposed merger of  all financial regulatory agencies under a cabinet- 
level superregulator, mentioned in footnote 1. While duplicative and inconsis- 
tent regulation  might be eliminated,  it is not clear that this  new regulatory 
structure  is  necessary  to  accomplish  that  goal.  The framework  developed 
herein  can be readily extended to analyze this proposal.  The authors of  the 
proposal maintain  that the new  structure will lead to “consistent” regulation 
across market centers; however, our analysis has suggested that a level playing 
field will not result in an efficient level of regulation across markets that differ 
in their principal users and in their structure. More important, this paper has 
demonstrated that the incentives of regulators are the principal determinant of 
the rules that are enacted. How would the incentives of the superregulator be 
different than those of an individual agency head? Would the merger lead to a 
more efficient level of regulation across all markets, or would it increase log- 
rolling and other voting inefficiencies within the superagency? Any proposed 
change in regulatory structure should first and foremost be evaluated in terms 
of its impact on regulatory incentives. 
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Comment  Edward H. Fleischman 
In his paper (chap. 7 in this volume), relating  to the likely more important 
obverse of our present topic-competition  and collusion of regulatory regimes 
in the transnational  sphere-Lawrence  J. White concludes one section with 
the statement that “the real-world imperfections of  government have yielded 
numerous instances of the regulatory process’s being used for abusive purposes 
and reaching inefficient outcomes. . . . These abuses . . . point toward . . . the 
value of frequent reassessments of the motives, methods and outcomes of ex- 
isting regulatory regimes.” Proceeding from an awareness born of experience 
as well as academic study, I think that the paper by Albrecht, Bronfman, and 
Messenheimer can be seen-and  should be received gratefully-as  just such 
a reassessment. 
The heart of the proposition presented to us is that “the question of optimal 
regulatory structure . . . depends on the incentives facing regulators, and the 
degree of complementarity or substitutability of the products to be regulated. 
In any event, rules are not independent of the regulatory structure.” 
That rules are not independent of regulatory  structure I accept and agree. 
Laying incentives aside for a moment, I think it fair to summarize the paper as 
suggesting that it is the degree of  complementarity or substitutability of the 
Edward H. Fleischman is a former commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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products and services regulated by financial regulators that is crucial to utiliza- 
tion of  the framework put forward in the paper for predicting the impact of 
regulatory structure on efficiency. 
That the paper’s model speaks in terms of  a single or a unitary good pro- 
duced and regulated in each of two markets, while  in fact the products and 
services produced in the financial markets and regulated by the financial regu- 
lators are in each market multiple and often distinct from one another, should 
not derogate from the validity of the paper’s conclusion-except  that that very 
multiplicity  and differentiatedness shreds the key  distinction between substi- 
tute and complementary markets. 
The domestic financial markets are neither wholly or distinguishably substi- 
tutable nor wholly or distinguishably complementary; rather, they partake of 
complementarity and substitutability in varying and ever-changing degrees, as 
product and service mix in either (assuming that there are only two) reacts on 
and affects product and service mix in the other-in  part, I understand, re- 
flecting  internal  and  external  marketplace  constraints  and  regulatory  con- 
straints-but  the very complexity of the mix fractionalizes the impact of either 
competition or collusion among regulators on efficiency. Again, the inquiry 
into what he calls “government failure” (i.e., regulatory inability to effect [or 
affect] efficiency) is part of White’s presentation. 
My mention of the possibility of multiple (i.e., more than two) markets and 
my references to White’s presentation on the transnational issues suggest not 
only the existence of  other financial markets and other financial regulators in 
the domesric economy, but more important, of  course, also the existence of 
markets abroad, which are increasingly easily substitutable and which tend to 
be much less regulated than their analogs here. If the thesis of the present paper 
proves itself by its applicability in the international sphere, I question whether 
the implications of that proof strengthen or weaken the robustness of its appli- 
cability to the activities of individual regulatory regimes here at home. 
Well, I do want to return to incentives. The paper assumes regulators moti- 
vated solely by efficiency, although extending somewhat to take into account 
the regulators’  own view of their utility function. I suggest, respectfully, that 
that assumption is simply too thin. 
In a recent book focusing on the SEC, the author seeks to apply rational 
choice theory to the dynamics of SEC policymaking, that is, to regulatory in- 
centives in one financial regulatory agency. In that author’s words, “The formal 
and informal structures and procedural rules that guide bureaucratic behavior 
are critical to policy outcomes because they create incentives for action.” 
That  author  selects from the rational-choice  literature  the  approaches  to 
studying regulatory incentives that focus on the relationships between the regu- 
lator and its oversight, enabling, appointing and auditing institutions: the Con- 
gress, the president, the General Accounting Office. I would suggest looking in 
another direction as well. Regulators are institutions, but they are institutions 
comprising individual people-people  who care not only for their respective 31  Regulatory Regimes: Rules and Regulatory Structure 
institutions  but  for  themselves.  Career  safety  and  enhancement  are  even 
stronger  incentives  than  institutional  policy  preservation  and enhancement, 
and often those incentives are intertwined. 
I  once  spoke  of  the  principal  commandment  for  government  regulators 
(omitted from the decalogue only by an unnoticed and erroneous touch on the 
delete key): Thou shalt expand thy jurisdiction with all thy heart, with all thy 
soul,  and  with  all  thy  might.  That commandment  is  not  only  institution- 
directed; it reflects the psychology of personal incentive: “My agency is grow- 
ing; I am more important.” “My division is getting new powershew fundsfnew 
programs; I am advancing in stature.” “The markets we regulate are increasing 
in volume and importance; I have prospects for more career satisfaction as well 
as more career advancement.” And, negatively, as the present paper points out 
in the context of the self-protection of regulators in having enough regulations 
in place to cover every conceivable form of fraud or other undesirable behav- 
ior: “Although I may get no gold stars and no promotions for efficiency, my 
agency will be tarred and feathered in Congress and the press, and I will be 
subject to career termination or its equivalent in civil service or political exile, 
if any form of fraud or other undesirable behavior [which may include merely 
behavior resulting in market volatility-as  though volatility were not inherent 
in markets] actually slips through the net of agency prohibitions.” 
In my experience, personal incentives  are key to regulators’ construction 
and implementation of policy, and self-protection is usually a stronger incen- 
tive than efficiency promotion. 
So I take the present paper’s thesis warily, and with deep-seated reservations, 
though with sufficient respect for all three of its authors to know that it merits 
further consideration. 
In an interview last August, Albrecht put some of his thoughts underlying 
the present paper into layman’s language. He was quoted as saying “Regulatory 
structure is not an end in  itself, but only a means of arriving at a sensible 
system of rules. The best structure is that which gives regulators the ability and 
the incentives to create appropriate rules. . . . What regulators do is a lot more 
important than how many agencies there are.” To that, we can all say amen. 
Authors’ Reply 
Economists and attorneys all too often appear to operate on separate planets. 
Not only do they speak different languages, but they observe different realities. 
One of the great pleasures we get in dealing with Ed Fleischman  is that he 
lives on the same planet we do. He is an attorney who not only understands 
economics but also listens to economists and is listened to by economists. We 
can only wish that some of his fellow attorneys at the SEC had listened to him 
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Unfortunately  (or perhaps fortunately), understanding economics is not al- 
ways the  same as understanding  economists. We  economists  spend a lot of 
time constructing our own planet with its own language, which only we under- 
stand. We  oversimplify  reality  in  order to  be  able to construct abstract and 
internally consistent models. But there is a method to our madness. In oversim- 
plifying reality, we try to gain insight into the real world. 
Fleischman has reacted, we believe, to our simplifying assumptions in the 
way that most noneconomists would. In so doing, he appears to have missed 
the purpose of these assumptions, and, thus, he appears not to realize that our 
insight into the real world is actually quite similar to the substance of his com- 
ments. But even absent that realization, we think (as usual) that he has made 
some points worth considering. 
We turn first to what we think he has missed. Our simplification of reality 
involved  three  abstractions.  Our first  abstraction  established  an  efficiency 
benchmark by which we judge how well regulators are doing. The source of 
Fleischman’s concern seems to lie in our second abstraction regarding the in- 
centives of regulators. He says that “laying incentives aside . . . ,  it is the degree 
of complementarity or substitutability of the products . . . regulated . . .  that is 
crucial to . . . predicting the impact of regulatory structure on efficiency.” He 
misses our main point, which is that first and foremost regulators’  incentives 
matter. Not only do they matter, but we characterize these incentives exactly 
the way Fleischman does. Their natural tendencies are to expand their turf and 
to be risk averse. This is the essence of our second abstraction from reality: that 
regulators act as if they have a utility function encompassing these tendencies. 
Our third abstraction from reality is intended to gain insight into what regu- 
lators’  incentives imply for efficiency  over alternative  regulatory structures. 
We assume that there are just two financial products being regulated, each one 
under the jurisdiction of its own regulator and, alternatively, both products un- 
der the jurisdiction of a single regulator. Fleischman critiques that this is not 
representative of the real world. We agree. But that is not our point. Our point 
is that the incentives of  regulators are relevant  to eficiency. This relevance 
means that, if the regulated products are substitutes, then regulatory collusion 
will increase harm to market users of those products. And if the regulated prod- 
ucts are complements, regulatory collusion will actually increase the welfare 
of these market users.’ 
To us, this story seems to be quite rich in its implications for the design of 
regulatory  structure that seeks to maximize the welfare of market users. This 
richness is not diminished by the fact that the real world is much more complex 
than that in our story. By emphasizing  regulatory incentives  in our route to 
regulatory reform, we can reduce the abilities of regulators to impose excessive 
regulatory net burdens. We can reduce government failure. 
I. This result in  thc context of  firms was analyzed years ago by Cournot ([  18381 1897) and by 
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This, of course, is easier said than done. And in criticizing our third abstrac- 
tion, Fleischman has raised some interesting empirical issues. “Domestic fi- 
nancial markets . . .  partake of complementarity and substitutability in varying 
and ever-changing  degrees, . . . reflecting internal  and external marketplace 
constraints and regulatory constraints” (emphasis added). We agree. But we 
do not believe that this detracts from our conclusion. Clearly, financial innova- 
tion is not independent of regulatory structure; it is endogenous to a large ex- 
tent. If  regulators have an incentive to approach efficiency (say because ex- 
isting substitute products are under separate  jurisdictions),  then individuals in 
the market will enjoy an incentive to create complementary  instruments. On 
the other hand, if a monopoly regulator has an incentive to depart from effi- 
ciency (say because substitute products are under its jurisdiction), then individ- 
uals in the market will have an incentive to avoid excessive regulatory net bur- 
dens.  Innovation  will  seek  substitute  products  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
regulator.  Of  course,  these  substitutes  may  include  those  beyond  domestic 
borders. 
Fleischman thoughtfully questions the robustness of our conclusions to “the 
existence of markets abroad, which are increasingly  easily substitutable and 
which do tend to be much less regulated than their analogs here.” Our view is 
that foreign competition is indeed beneficial. Since regulatory incentives mat- 
ter, foreign competition tends to reduce the ability of domestic regulators to 
depart from efficiency. 
Rules, nonetheless, are not independent  of regulatory structure. Regulators 
internationally have the same tendencies as our own: to expand their turn and 
to be risk averse. In other words, they act as if they have a utility function 
encompassing these tendencies.  If regulated  products  tend  to be substitutes 
internationally, then, internationally, regulators  would  like to  collude  to in- 
crease their power. But in so doing, they would increase government failure. 
Domestic regulatory competition raises the cost to regulators of forming such 
an international cartel of  regulators. A domestic regulatory monopoly, on the 
other hand, would  lower that cost. Our monopoly  regulator  would be like a 
dominant “regulatory firm” in an international cartel of regulators, increasing 
their potential to reduce the efficiency of regulation worldwide. 
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